The trigger for
the
Spanish-American
War
was a false
one. Spain did
not plant a
mine, nor did
anyone else. The
Maine was
destroyed by
11,190 pounds of
its own powder
in a magazine
for shells,
ignited by fire
in a coal bunker
separated by a
single bulkhead.
It was a
preventable
accident. Had
this been
publicly known
at the time, as
it might have
been, it is
conceivable
America would
not have gone to
war; and it
might very well
not have become
an imperialist
power.
That the
Spaniards did
not blow up the
warship is the
inescapable
conclusion of a
study carried
out by Admiral
Hyman G.
Rickover in 1976
with expert
testimony. The
celebrated
admiral's study
was published by
the Naval
History Division
of the
Department of
the Navy, but
received
surprisingly
little
attention.
Histories still
routinely refer
to the Maine's
being sunk by a
mine. Two
official
inquiries, one
in 1898 and
another in 1911,
both blamed a
mine.
Both are deeply
flawed. Both
failed to call
technical
experts. The
evidence that
induced the
first board to
report so
devastatingly to
McKinley was the
divers' findings
that the keel
was bent into an
inverted V shape
(^) in the
region of
structural
frames 18 to 22.
This, the board
concluded, could
not have been
caused by the
magazine
explosion and
could have been
brought about
only by the
upward force of
an external
explosion at
this point. They
were wrong. The
1911 inquiry,
with the benefit
of a raised
wreck, found
that the center
of the explosion
was not at frame
18 but in the
magazine near
frame 27. And
the keel damage
could, after
all, be
accounted for by
the action of
gases of low
explosives in
the forward
magazine. It had
no bearing on
whether there
was an external
burst.
The mystery
should have been
cleared up there
and then in
1911. But that
board still
concluded that
the magazine was
exploded by an
external force.
The board did so
because it was
puzzled that one
of the four
bottom sections
of the Maine was
displaced
inward.
Rickover's
experts, Ib S.
Hansen and
Robert S. Price,
explain this by
the dynamics of
the explosion on
the particular
design of the
Maine and the
fact that later
experiments with
explosions
inside destroyer
bulkheads have
produced results
just like the
Maine. Moreover,
the small
section of
plating folded
inward showed no
evidence of the
deformation that
would have
certainly been
brought about by
a Spanish
contact mine of
the day of 100
to 200 pounds of
guncotton-the
size of mine
that would have
been needed to
detonate the
magazine. Other
evidence also
points away from
a mine-no upward
plume of water,
no upward shock
and the sheer
unfeasibility of
anyone being
able to place a
mine of
sufficient size
in the right
location.
Of an accident,
on the contrary,
there is
persuasive
evidence.
Between 1894 and
1908, more than
20 coal-bunker
fires were
reported on U.S.
naval ships. The
Cincinnati and
New York nearly
went the way of
the Maine. A sad
fact of the
Maine is that
while Captain
Charles Sigsbee
may have been a
good seaman and
a brave man, he
was, in
Rickover's
words, "the
victim of the
new technology
which was
transforming the
Navy . . . and
perhaps it is
also significant
that the
Kearsarge and
Texas while
under his
command were
also found
dirty." Captain
Sigsbee did not
know how much
coal there was
in the forward
bunkers. The
coal he had on
the Maine was
the same brand
that had ignited
on the New York
in March 1897,
just three and a
half hours after
an inspection.
The explosion on
the Maine came
nearly 12 hours
after the last
required
inspection,
ample time for a
bunker fire to
begin, heat the
bulkheads and
set fire to
adjacent
compartments.
Rickover's
conclusion bears
remembering: "In
the modern
technological
age, the battle
cry ÔRemember
the Maine!'
should have a
special meaning
for us. With the
vastness of our
government and
the difficulty
of controlling
it, we must make
sure that those
in Ôhigh places'
do not, without
most careful
consideration of
the
consequences,
exert our
prestige and
might. Such uses
of our power may
result in
serious
international
actions at great
cost in lives
and
money-injurious
to the interests
and standing of
the United
States."
Recommended
Reading
1898: The
Birth of the
American Century
by David Traxel
Both are deeply
flawed. Both
failed to call
technical
experts. The
evidence that
induced the
first board to
report so
devastatingly to
McKinley was the
divers' findings
that the keel
was bent into an
inverted V shape
(^) in the
region of
structural
frames 18 to 22.
This, the board
concluded, could
not have been
caused by the
magazine
explosion and
could have been
brought about
only by the
upward force of
an external
explosion at
this point. They
were wrong. The
1911 inquiry,
with the benefit
of a raised
wreck, found
that the center
of the explosion
was not at frame
18 but in the
magazine near
frame 27. And
the keel damage
could, after
all, be
accounted for by
the action of
gases of low
explosives in
the forward
magazine. It had
no bearing on
whether there
was an external
burst.